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Abstract
This article proposes a novel theoretical framework for examining
trust-repair discourse. The model identifies two fundamental discourse
strategies available to the trust-breaker when trust is at stake (i) to
engage with and act upon the discourses that represent a potential
source of distrust – neutralize the negative, (ii) to communicate a trust-
worthy discourse identity – emphasize the positive. These strategies
are realized in discourse through the use of dialogic engagement and
evaluative/a↵ective language, respectively. The ultimate communica-
tive goal of the strategies is that of promoting the addressees’ positive
(re-)assessment of the speaker’s ability, integrity and benevolence. The
model is applied to the analysis of the CEO letter published by BP
one year after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The analysis has the
twofold purpose of demonstrating the viability of the model and deter-
mining the discourse strategies deployed by the CEO to repair trust in
the company after the accident.
Keywords: trust, evaluation, a↵ect, dialogism, ability, integrity, benev-
olence, CEO letters, BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill
1 Introduction
Trust is pervasive in social life and a basic element of both intimate and dis-
tant interpersonal relations. As social relations are subject to change, trust
is a dynamic interpersonal construct; it is constantly negotiated and renego-
tiated through social and communicative interaction (Cook, 2001; Gillespie,
2011; Ingenho↵ and Sommer, 2010; Linell and Markova´, 2013; Markova´ and
Gillespie, 2008).
Certain events or behaviors can undermine trust. When this happens,
compensatory action by the trust-breaker (TB) is expected. Trust can be
repaired by modifying one’s behavior, but it can also be renegotiated through
discourse. Discourse plays a particularly prominent role in situations where
the deceived party cannot monitor the TB’s behavior directly. One such
case is the relation between companies and their stakeholders.
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Trust is a valuable asset for business organizations (Barney and Hansen,
1994; Ingenho↵ and Sommer, 2010; Pirson and Malhotra, 2011). However,
some actions or events initiated by a company can damage trust between the
company and its stakeholders, creating distrust and threatening its social
legitimacy and survival (Poppo and Schepker, 2010). A recent and widely
reported case of this kind is the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, which was pro-
voked by the explosion and sinking of an o↵shore oil platform operated by
the British multinational oil and gas company BP in the Gulf of Mexico
on the 20th of April 2010. The accident killed eleven crewmembers and
caused a major oil spill that has had profound consequences for the envi-
ronment and the economy of the Gulf of Mexico. The spill triggered a wave
of public distrust in BP, due to the company’s responsibility in the accident
and the controversial way in which it handled both the situation itself and
communications about it.
What happens when trust is broken? How is trust re-negotiated in dis-
course? In order to seek answers to these questions, this article proposes a
novel theoretical framework for examining trust-repair discourse and applies
it to the analysis of the CEO letter included in BP’s 2010 annual report,
published one year after the spill. The analysis is qualitative and performed
through a systematic close reading and interpretation of the text. It fo-
cuses on the linguistic resources that can be directly associated with two
main types of trust-repair discourse strategies, (i) engaging with and acting
upon the discourses that constitute an actual or potential source of distrust
– neutralize the negative, (ii) constructing and communicating a trustwor-
thy discourse identity – emphasize the positive. The former strategy draws
on the resources for dialogic engagement (Martin and White, 2005; White,
2003, 2012), involving expressions of epistemic modality, attribution and de-
nial. The latter is mainly realized through evaluative and a↵ective language
(Bednarek, 2008; Hunston, 2011; Martin and White, 2005). The use of these
resources in discourse is interpreted in light of the behavioral model of inter-
personal trust described in Mayer et al. (1995). The ultimate goal of these
strategies is seen as that of repairing trust by promoting the addressees’
positive (re-)assessment of the TB’s ability, integrity and benevolence.
The main purpose of this study is to improve our understanding of the
discursive and pragmatic dynamics of trust, by providing the conceptual
tools for systematically analyzing and explaining how trust is (re-)negotiated
in discourse. In addition, it o↵ers a novel perspective on BP’s communicative
response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. While this topic has generated
substantial scholarly interest (e.g. Breeze, 2012; Choi, 2012; Diers and Dono-
hue, 2013; Harlow et al., 2011; Harlow and Harlow, 2013; Howell et al., 2014;
Muralidharan et al., 2011; O’Connor, 2011; Schultz et al., 2012; Smithson
and Venette, 2013; Wickman, 2013), none of the previous studies has, in
fact, investigated it from the point of view of trust repair.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses previous work on
2
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trust. In section 3, our model of trust-repair discourse is described. Section
4 illustrates the model through a detailed analysis of several excerpts from
BP’s CEO letter and provides a concise overview of the analysis results.
Finally, section 5 discusses the main findings and section 6 makes some
concluding remarks.
2 Trust
This section presents the background to this study. It starts with an overview
of the model of interpersonal trust developed by Mayer et al. (1995), which
serves as the starting point for our model of trust-repair discourse. This is
followed by a review of previous work focusing on the relationship between
trust and discourse.
2.1 Mayer, Davis and Shoorman’s model of trust
Being a pervasive and critical element of social relations (Luhmann, 1979;
Misztal, 1996), trust has been widely investigated across a range of disci-
plines, yielding a number of conceptualizations and definitions. One of the
most influential models of interpersonal trust is the one developed by Mayer
et al. (1995). The model originally stems from the business management
literature, but it has been extensively applied in a number of di↵erent areas,
including marketing, accounting, psychology, sociology and communication
(Schoorman et al., 2007).
Mayer et al. (1995: 712) define trust as “the willingness of a party to
be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that
the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irre-
spective of the ability to monitor or control that other party”. Central to
this definition is the idea that risk-taking in an inescapable aspect of trust
relations. Trust necessarily involves risk-taking, as individuals may exploit
their position of trust for personal gain. Therefore, when we trust someone
we become vulnerable to their potential opportunistic behavior. As Mayer
et al. (1995) explain, we generally trust other people under the assumption
that they will behave in a way that is beneficial to us. In turn, this belief
hinges on our assessment of their trustworthiness.
According to Mayer et al. (1995), we assess other people’s trustwor-
thiness on three main criteria: a) ability, b) integrity and c) benevolence.
Ability concerns the trustee’s skills and expertise in a specific domain, i.e.
how competent he or she is in handling a particular task or situation. In-
tegrity relates to the trustee’s moral and ethical values, e.g. how honest,
fair and sincere he or she is. Finally, benevolence refers to the trustee’s care
and goodwill to the trustor, i.e. the extent to which the trustee is believed
to have the trustor’s interests at heart, beyond egocentric concerns. Each
of these factors, as Mayer et al. (1995: 717) argue, “contributes a unique
3
MA
NU
SC
RI
PT
!Ability!
Benevolence!
Integrity!
Trust! Risk!Taking!in!Relationship! Outcomes!
Trustor’s!Propensity!
Perceived!Risk!
Factors!of!Perceived!Trustworthiness!
Figure 1: Mayer, Davis and Shoorman’s model of trust (Mayer et al., 1995:
715).
perceptual perspective from which to consider the trustee, while the set pro-
vides a solid and parsimonious foundation for the empirical study of trust
for another party”.
Fig. 1 provides a visual representation of Mayer et al.’s (1995) model.
As the diagram shows, the trustor’s assessment of the trustee’s trustworthi-
ness is mediated by their propensity to trust. Accordingly, the amount of
trust the trustor has in the trustee is positively correlated with both their
assessment of the other party’s ability, integrity and benevolence and their
(dis)inclination to trust others (Mayer et al., 1995). In addition, the feedback
arrow indicates that the outcomes of a relationship will a↵ect and dynam-
ically shape the trustor’s impressions of the other party’s trustworthiness
and, in turn, the trust relationship itself.
While Mayer et al.’s model of trust was devised to explain trust in dyadic
interpersonal relations, i.e. between two individuals who know each other
personally, it can easily be generalized to account for the relationship be-
tween a company and its stakeholders (e.g. Caldwell and Clapham, 2003;
Greenwood and Van Buren III, 2010; Ingenho↵ and Sommer, 2010; Schoor-
man et al., 2007; Xie and Peng, 2009). As Ingenho↵ and Sommer (2010:
342) note, “[t]he origin of trust lies in the individual, whereas the referent,
the trusted party, can be both individual and collective”. Nonetheless, a fun-
damental di↵erence distinguishes these two types of trust relation. Whereas
two individuals who know each other personally can have direct knowledge
and experience of their counterpart, this is rarely the case for stakehold-
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ers and organizations (Ingenho↵ and Sommer, 2010; Poppo and Schepker,
2010). As a consequence, the ‘distance’ that separates organizations and
their various audiences entails that the information imbalance that char-
acterizes trust relations in general is, in this case, maximized. Information
about a company can, in fact, be hard and costly to obtain. It can be partial,
inaccurate and easily manipulated by various agents. Most importantly, this
also means that stakeholders’ knowledge and impressions of a company’s ac-
tions, behavior and intentions are, in most cases, entirely mediated through
discourse.
2.2 Previous work on trust in discourse
Trust and distrust are intimately tied to language and communication (Linell
and Keselman, 2011; Linell and Markova´, 2013). Yet, whereas the notion
of trust has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention from a range of
disciplines, linguistic research on this topic is still relatively sparse. Trust,
as noted by Linell and Markova´ (2013), is virtually absent in the work of
prominent theorists in the field of pragmatics, except for sporadic references
to it as a background condition for verbal interaction. A similar situation
exists in the domain of Critical Discourse Analysis (e.g. Fairclough 2003;
Fairclough and Wodak 1997; Hart 2011; Wodak and Meyer 2009). Despite
the ubiquitousness of trust in social interaction and its importance in the
dynamics of persuasion and social influence, it has not, to our knowledge,
been the subject of systematic investigation in this area.
Several authors have discussed the role of discourse as a vehicle for ne-
gotiating trust but without attempting to provide a comprehensive and sys-
tematic account of its linguistic underpinnings. Palmieri (2009) focuses on
the role of argumentation in UBS bank’s attempt to retain stakeholders’
trust in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. The author analyses a press
release announcing the appointment of a new Chairman as part of the bank’s
strategy to overcome the crisis. While the analysis provides useful insights
into the rhetorics of trust-building, it is restricted to argumentation and no
attention is paid to other features of the text. The author notes, for example,
that the Chairman’s persona is exploited as a persuasive device, but he does
not analyze how his ethos is discursively constructed, nor does he specify
what linguistic means are involved in this process. Also, the analysis fails
to problematize the rhetorical strategies identified in the text in relation to
the construct of trust.
Linell and Keselman (2011) examine how trust and distrust are dis-
cursively managed during an asylum interview between a Russian asylum
seeker and a Swedish o cer. The main aim of the study is to investigate
how, in a social situation characterized by uncertainty, ambiguity and mu-
tual skepticism, distrust arises and is dealt with by the interactants. Linell
and Keselman’s (2011) study clearly shows the centrality of discourse in the
5
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negotiation of interpersonal trust. The authors’ chief focus is, however, on
face-to-face interaction. This is one of the reasons why their findings are
di cult to integrate into the present study, which focuses on trust repair
in written discourse. Another reason is that Linell and Keselman (2011)
adopt a primarily descriptive approach and do not formulate any specific
hypotheses as to what linguistic resources may play a role in eliciting or dis-
couraging trust. Two observations that the authors make are, nonetheless,
relevant for the present study. First, they note that in a situation where
trust is at stake, the theme of trust is likely to surface in discourse, i.e. trust
is topicalized (Markova´ and Gillespie, 2008: 19). Second, Linell and Kesel-
man’s (2011) study highlights the dynamic and sequential nature of trust;
trust and distrust dynamically transform as the interaction unfolds and as
events or discourses trigger sequences of responses and counteractions. We
suggest that this type of sequential development can be observed in the case
of the Deepwater Horizon spill too, where BP’s actions and discourses in the
aftermath of the accident triggered a reaction of distrust from stakeholders,
which, in turn, prompted the company’s trust-repair discourse (see section
3.1).
Gillespie and Cornish (2013) analyze the case of ‘bank run’ that struck
the British Northern Rock in 2007, focusing on the communicative actions
undertaken by the bank and the British government to halt depositors’
precipitous withdrawal of their funds. While the study is not primarily
concerned with discourse analysis, Gillespie and Cornish (2013) do, if just
briefly, analyze a text published by Northern Rock that could be considered
as an instance of trust-repair discourse. The text is a message from the
bank’s CEO included in a print advertisement published in the main British
newspapers after the announcement that the government would guarantee
all the deposits held at Northern Rock. The authors discuss several interest-
ing features of the CEO’s message. Most notably, they highlight his e↵ort
to establish rapport with the audience through his ‘sincere’ apologies to the
bank’s customers and his attempt to bolster the credibility of the bank’s
strategy by appealing to the authority of an external entity, i.e. the British
Chancellor. Some of these findings are highly relevant and mirror some of
the discursive strategies observed in BP’s CEO letter. However, Gillespie
and Cornish (2013) do not go beyond pointing out some interesting aspects
of Northern Rock’s advert. The study does not o↵er a systematic account of
the discursive mechanisms of trust repair, nor does it explain how discourse
features connect to the bank’s communicative intents.
In sum, while discourse has been recognized to be a fundamental vehicle
for trust, the current literature does not provide a clear understanding of
how linguistic phenomena relate the construct of interpersonal trust. The
model of trust-repair discourse proposed here seeks to fill this gap.
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3 Trust-repair discourse
Our understanding of the concept of trust is profiled against a number of
di↵erent knowledge representations. An important part of those represen-
tations includes knowledge formed on the basis of experiences of situations
where trust is at stake. As mentioned before, trust is not a stable phe-
nomenon but a relation in a state of flux, and it is constantly up for ne-
gotiation in discourses where trust is involved. Trust relations have two
principal actors, the trustor and the trustee. They experience trust from
two di↵erent perspectives. The trustor is the risk-taker, who estimates the
trustworthiness of the trustee.
Another important part of the knowledge structure is the opposition of
trust and distrust. Human beings cannot conceive of trust without seeing
it in contrast to distrust (Linell and Markova´, 2013; Markova´ and Gillespie,
2008). This opposition may be viewed along a scale from trust to distrust
(Paradis and Willners, 2011), featuring degrees of trustworthiness with re-
spect to the trustee’s ability, integrity and benevolence. In the case of a
catastrophe like the one we are analyzing here, there is good reason for the
trustee to fear that there is a risk of potential loss of trust from the trustor.
This loss has to be re-established in action and re-negotiated in discourse.
This section deals with trust-repair discourse. It starts by discussing the
conditions that determine the need for trust repair, using the BP case study
as an example. Then, the model is described and illustrated with examples
from BP’s CEO letter.
3.1 Dynamics of trust violation and repair
Mayer et al.’s (1995) model posits that the outcomes of a relationship a↵ect
and contribute to shaping the trustor’s impressions of the trustees’s trust-
worthiness and, accordingly, the amount of trust they have in the trustee.
The need for trust repair arises when trust is perceived to have been violated.
An act of trust violation constitutes a negative outcome of a relationship
that changes the trustor’s impressions of the trustee’s trustworthiness and
thereby erodes trust.
As Lewicki (2006: 107) explains, trust violation occurs when “we ob-
tain information that does not conform to our expectations of behavior
for the other”. When confronted with significant disconfirming evidence,
the trustor is pushed to reconsider their initial assumptions about the re-
lationship and the trustee (Lewicki, 2006: 107). Following an act of trust
violation, the trustor undergoes “a cognitive reappraisal of the relationship”
(Gillespie and Dietz, 2009: 133). As part of this process, they re-evaluate
the trust breaker’s ability, integrity and benevolence, possibly downgrading
their initial assessment (Tomlinson and Mayer, 2009).
After a violation, the trustor’s trust in the trustee will be lower than
7
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the initial level. The resulting level of trust may range from lower trust to
absolute distrust. Following Shul et al.’s definition (2008, 1293), “distrust
denotes a perception of vulnerability due [...] to fear of the other’s motives,
intentions, and prospective actions”. It is a psychological state characterized
by hypervigilance (Gillespie and Dietz, 2009), suspicion (Kramer, 1999),
and a tendency to attribute sinister intentions to the other party’s behavior
(Lewicki et al., 1998).
In response to this situation, the trust-breaker will adopt measures to
counteract distrust and restore trust. Their trust-repair e↵orts will be di-
rected at improving the trustor’s impressions of their trustworthiness. To
this end, they will both address salient negative expectations arising from
the trust-breaking event and attempt to (re)establish positive expectations
about their future trustworthiness (Gillespie and Dietz, 2009; Kim et al.,
2004). The dynamics of trust violation and trust repair described here are
summarized in Fig. 2.
 
 initial trust level trust violation 
ability 
integrity 
benevolence 
lower 
trust/distrust 
trust-repair 
Damaged 
trustworthiness 
counteract)negative)expectations)restore)positive)expectations)
Figure 2: Dynamics of trust violation and repair
The dynamics illustrated above can be observed in the case of BP’s Deep-
water Horizon oil spill. While generalizations are di cult to make given that
di↵erent stakeholder groups have di↵erent interests, agendas and degrees of
vulnerability (Swift, 2001: 21), and that individual variability exists (Mayer
et al., 1995), stakeholders’ attitude towards BP before the accident may be
described as one of lack of distrust1 (Swift, 2001). Lack of distrust refers
to stakeholders’ belief that impersonal structures such as laws, regulations
and controls are su cient to guarantee the predictability of a company’s be-
havior (see also McKnight et al.’s (1998) notion of institution-based trust).
Indirect evidence of this type of attitude can be derived from BP’s abil-
ity to successfully obtain drilling licenses in the Gulf of Mexico2, steady
financial support from investors and a robust business performance. The
absence of noteworthy stakeholder-led initiatives aimed at influencing the
company’s decision-making and behavior, e.g. protests, lobbying, product
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boycotts (Frooman, 1999; Hendry, 2005), may also be seen as an indication
that stakeholders’ trust in the company was not at stake before the spill.
However, this state of a↵airs quickly changed after the accident. BP’s
repeated failed attempts to stop the oil leak exposed its unpreparedness for
such events, causing frustration among the public opinion and the U.S. gov-
ernment. In addition, BP’s initial attempts to downplay the consequences
of the spill (Webb, 2010), its inaccurate estimates of the amount of oil es-
caping from the damaged well (O’Connor, 2011), its denial of the existence
of large plumes of dispersed oil underneath the sea surface (Shogren, 2011)
raised serious concerns about the company’s transparency and accountabil-
ity (Ritchie et al., 2011: 8). The situation was made worse by BP’s poor
public relations (Shogren, 2011; Sylves and Comfort, 2012). A series of
ga↵es and improper comments by major BP representatives overshadowed
the company’s e↵orts to express regret for the incident, casting doubt on its
sincerity and goodwill (O’Connor, 2011). In particular, the now infamous ‘I
want my life back’ comment made by BP’s former CEO Tony Hayward in an
interview at the peak of the crisis, alluded to the idea that the CEO and, by
extension, BP placed other priorities ahead of solving the crisis (O’Connor,
2011). Tony Hayward’s pronounced British accent and public behavior ex-
acerbated the negative e↵ects of such a comment, giving rise to a perception
of an ingroup/outgroup distinction between BP and the American public
along ethnic and social class lines (O’Connor, 2011). This perception was
further reinforced by Swedish BP Chairman’s ga↵e at a press conference
(O’Connor, 2011), during which he declared that, contrary to commonly
held beliefs, BP cares about “the small people”.3
On the basis of these observations we may infer that, following the acci-
dent, BP’s trustworthiness was at stake on all three levels of Mayer et al.’s
(1995) model. First, the company’s ability was called into question due to
its failed attempts to seal the leaking well. Second, BP’s integrity was un-
dermined, among other things, by its initial failure to fully acknowledge the
e↵ects of the spill and by its attempts to downplay its consequences. Finally,
BP’s e↵orts to show benevolence were hampered by the controversial public
statements of its president and CEO, which contributed to an impression
of BP as an out-group member, who, as such, did not genuinely care about
the victims of the spill and, more generally, about Americans.
The widespread feeling of distrust in BP in the aftermath of the spill can
be detected in the results of two nationwide polls conducted at the height of
the crisis, which revealed that most Americans blamed BP for the accident
and disapproved of the way the company handled it (Muralidharan et al.,
2011: 228). Similarly, a survey conducted by Gill et al. (2012: 12) four
months after the accident with residents of Alabama, one of the a↵ected
States, showed that BP was the least trusted among the parties involved in
the disaster. Signs of distrust in BP can also be seen in the behavior of other
key stakeholders. Confronted with the severe damage provoked by the spill
9
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and BP’s incapacity to rapidly bring it under control, U.S. President Barack
Obama enforced a temporary moratorium on o↵shore drilling, introducing
tougher regulations and controls at the same time (O’Connor, 2011). Clear
signs of distrust came from the company’s investors as well. Following the
disaster, BP’s stocks reached a fourteen-year low, halving the company’s
pre-crisis market value (O’Connor, 2011).
More importantly for our purposes, signs that trust in BP was at stake
can be detected in the company’s public discourse after the spill. Markova´
and Gillespie (2008: 19) observe that “when trust becomes explicitly ver-
balized and thematized, it normally means that [...] it is no longer taken
for granted and it may have been partly or totally destroyed”. This e↵ect
can be clearly observed in BP’s discourse after the spill. For instance, in his
letter to shareholders, the company’s Chairman puts significant emphasis
on the company’s need to restore trust after the accident. In one place he
declares:
BP is able to help meet the world’s growing need for energy, but
we can only do this if we have the trust of society. To achieve this,
we must ensure that safety and responsibility are at the heart
of everything we do. We must show that we can be trusted to
understand and manage our risks.
This discourse is echoed in the CEO letter, where Robert Dudley asserts
that “part of BP’s task right now is to show we can be trusted to handle
the industry’s most demanding jobs”. These examples reveal the company’s
awareness of the crisis of trust that the accident provoked and indicate that
repairing trust is one of its main communicative priorities.
3.2 The model of trust-repair discourse
This section describes our model of trust-repair discourse. The model aims
to provide a comprehensive framework for the analysis of trust-repair dis-
course by establishing a connection between the communicative goals of trust
repair, the discursive strategies that can be deployed to pursue these goals
and their concrete linguistic realization. The model is thus articulated at
three levels of analysis: (i) sought e↵ect, (ii) communicative action and (iii)
discourse-as-text. An overview of the model is schematically represented in
Fig. 3.4
10
MA
NU
SC
RI
PT
!
Discourse-as-text Communicative action Sought effect 
Dialogic engagement 
resources, e.g. epistemic 
modality, attribution, 
denial 
Evaluation (explicit and 
evoked) and affect 
Neutralize the negative 
(NN) 
Emphasise the  
positive (EP) 
Ability 
“We are competent” 
Integrity 
“We are honest” 
Benevolence 
“We care” 
Figure 3: A model of trust-repair discourse
The diagram in Fig. 3 combines the three levels of analysis accounted for
in the model. In the right-hand box, the sought e↵ects of trust-repair dis-
course are shown. At the level of communicative action, these goals are
pursued through two basic discursive strategies, i.e. neutralize the negative
(NN) and emphasize the positive (EP). At the level of discourse-as-text,
these strategies are realized in text through the resources listed under the
discourse-as-text heading. These three levels of analysis are described in
turn below.
Sought e↵ect
The basic assumption underlying the present framework is that language is
a form of social action (Austin, 1962; Fairclough, 1992; Ga¨rdenfors, 2014;
Levinson, 1983; Paradis, 2005, In press). In a broad sense, we use language
to ‘do things’ in social contexts, i.e. to influence other people’s states of
mind, beliefs and behavior in accordance with our goals and needs. In the
case of trust-repair discourse, the main communicative goal of the trust-
breaker (TB) is to change the interlocutor’s impressions and beliefs about
their trustworthiness and restore trust.
Trustworthiness is a complex and multifaceted construct. As noted ear-
lier, however, it is possible to classify the factors that account for some-
one’s trustworthiness in terms of ability, integrity and benevolence (Mayer
et al., 1995). When a trust-breaking event occurs, it will a↵ect the trustor’s
impressions of the TB’s trustworthiness along one or more of these dimen-
sions. Accordingly, trust-repair discourse will be geared towards acting on
and restoring the trustor’s impressions of the TB’s ability, integrity and
benevolence.
11
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Communicative action
There are two fundamental discursive strategies that the TB can enact to
achieve this communicative goal. On the one hand, the TB can act on
the source of distrust by engaging with and responding to the actual and
potential discourses that create, promote or sustain it. We term this strategy
neutralize the negative. This does not necessarily mean that the TB will
confront or reject all adverse discourses. On the contrary, the TB could
respond positively to them by showing agreement and understanding. In
either case, the TB seeks to neutralize the negative e↵ects that unfavorable
discourses might have on their trustworthiness. Alternatively, the TB can
discursively construct and communicate a trustworthy identity, emphasizing
and providing evidence for their positive qualities and virtues. We name
this strategy emphasize the positive. These communicative strategies can
be enacted simultaneously and interact in a single instance of trust-repair
discourse.
Discourse-as-text
At the discourse-as-text level, i.e. at the micro-level of language forms and
meanings (Fairclough, 1992), it is possible to identify a core set of linguistic
resources that realize the two discursive strategies discussed above. This en-
ables us to investigate them systematically and empirically via text analysis.
The resources are described and illustrated below, using examples from the
CEO’s letter.5
Neutralize the negative
The neutralize-the-negative strategy is realized through the linguistic re-
sources for dialogic engagement (Martin and White, 2005; White, 2003,
2012). This category includes all the devices that speakers use to take a
stance on the current topic and through which they position themselves vis-
a`-vis alternative viewpoints and potential responses from their interlocutors
(White, 2012: 61). The range of resources included in this category is broad,
comprising epistemic modals (e.g. believe, think, be certain that), markers
of evidentiality (e.g. see, hear, show that), expressions of attribution (e.g.
say, claim, argue), adversative discourse markers (e.g. yet, but) and nega-
tion/denial (Martin and White, 2005). What these resources share is a
dialogic functionality in the sense of Bakhtin (1981). They are used in dis-
course to mark the speaker’s intersubjective positioning with respect to the
backdrop of propositions and competing stances that every text is profiled
against (Martin and White, 2005).
An example of BP CEO’s use of one of these resources, namely nega-
tion/denial, to confront and neutralize an unfavorable discourse about the
company is the following.
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(1) Our fundamental purpose is to create value for shareholders, but we
also see ourselves as part of society, not apart from it.
Through the use of the negation marker not, the CEO evokes and simultane-
ously strongly rejects the – actual or anticipated – claim that the company
would privilege investors’ interests at the expense of society. By doing so,
he seeks to neutralize this unfavorable discourse and protect BP’s integrity
from the negative e↵ects that it could produce. If we combine the three
levels of analysis of the model we arrive at the analysis represented schemat-
ically in Fig. 4. Thus, the communicative goal of the statement in (1) is
to promote a positive view of the company’s integrity. This goal is pursued
through the neutralize-the-negative strategy, which is realized in discourse
via negation/denial.
!Discourse-as-text 
 
denial (negation) 
Communicative action 
 
neutralize the negative 
Sought effect 
 
integrity 
Figure 4: A schematic representation of example 1
According to Martin and White (2005), engagement resources can be
broadly subdivided into those that act to challenge or refute di↵erent view-
points, termed dialogic contraction, and those that open the dialogic space
of the text to competing perspectives, termed dialogic expansion. Example
(1) is an instance of dialogic contraction, as the negation marker acts to con-
tract the dialogic space for alternative positions, thereby ‘fending-o↵’ the
adverse discourse it evokes (i.e. that the company does see itself as apart
from society). The following is an example of dialogic expansion from BP’s
letter.
(2) Then came the unthinkable. A subsea blowout in deep water was
seen as a very, very low-probability event, by BP and the entire
industry – but it happened.
The implications of the CEO’s statement in (2) are substantial, given that a
subsea blowout was the event that provoked the explosion of the Deepwater
Horizon platform. The CEO uses the verb see to frame the proposition that
‘subsea blowouts in deep water are highly unlikely events’ as grounded in
the company’s own subjective opinion. Therefore, he presents the company’s
viewpoint as one among a range of possible positions on the subject matter
at hand.6 By explicitly marking his statement as a subjective proposal
and allowing for alternative stances, the CEO anticipates and seeks to pre-
empt the skepticism and suspicion that an utterly categorical claim on such
a highly controversial issue could provoke in the reader. In other words,
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see serves to protect the company’s integrity from potential allegations of
responsibility denial that could derive from it.7 The analysis of (2) can be
thus represented schematically in Fig. 5.
!Discourse-as-text 
 
epistemic marker ‘see’ 
Communicative action 
 
neutralize the negative 
Sought effect 
 
integrity 
Figure 5: A schematic representation of example 2
Emphasize the positive
The emphasize-the-positive strategy is directly connected to the linguistic
resources that speakers use to express evaluation (Bednarek, 2006; Hun-
ston, 2011; Hunston and Thompson, 2000; Martin and White, 2005) and
a↵ect (Bednarek, 2008; Besnier, 1990; Martin and White, 2005; Ochs and
Schie↵elin, 1989).
Evaluation refers to the linguistic expression of positive or negative sub-
jective assessments of people, objects or events. Although adjectives and
adverbs are primarily associated with this language function, evaluation
is not tied to any specific set of language forms, but it can be conveyed
through an open-ended range of expressions. Evaluations may have positive
or negative valence and may be based on a number of di↵erent criteria and
parameters (Bednarek, 2006; Martin and White, 2005). For instance, indi-
viduals may be praised or criticized for their skills and abilities, tenacity or
moral integrity (Martin and White, 2005). Evaluations, and in particular
self-evaluations, are a crucial means through which speakers construct their
discourse identity (Fairclough, 2003; Fuoli, 2012).
In BP’s CEO letter, evaluative language is used at di↵erent points to
convey a positive image of the company and its members, as shown in (3).
(3) The sound underlying performance across our business continues to
give us a solid foundation, and speaks volumes for the inner
strengths of BP and our people.
Unlike the examples of neutralize-the-negative strategy discussed above, the
CEO does not overtly engage with and respond to any adverse discourse
challenging the company’s trustworthiness in (3). His assessment is formu-
lated as a declarative sentence and contains no marker of dialogic engage-
ment. Rather, he uses highly positive evaluative expressions (underlined
items) to emphasize the company’s stability despite the crisis resulting from
the spill. At the sought e↵ect level, these positive assessments promote a
positive impression of the company’s ability. The analysis of this example
is represented schematically in Fig. 6.
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!Discourse-as-text 
 
positive evaluation 
Communicative action 
 
emphasize the positive 
Sought effect 
 
ability 
Figure 6: A schematic representation of example 3
Martin and White (2005: 61) point out that evaluation can not only
be expressed through the use of manifestly positive or negative words or
expressions, such as those underlined in example (3), but it can also be con-
veyed though factual information that has the capacity, in a given culture or
context, to elicit a judgmental response in the reader. The authors term the
former inscribed evaluation and the latter invoked evaluation. The following
is an example of invoked evaluation from BP’s CEO letter.
(4) We have accepted and are implementing the report’s
recommendations. We are also sharing what we have learned with
governments and others in our industry, and we are co-operating
with a series of other investigations, inquiries and hearings.
Example (4) provides a factual account of BP’s actions after the accident and
does not include any specific words that carry an explicit positive assessment
of the company. Yet, this statement invites a positive appraisal of BP, whose
actions can be interpreted as a sign that the company is fully committed to
the value of transparency and aligned with the stakeholders’ desire for truth
about the accident. In part, this e↵ect is due to the positive meaning of the
words accept, share, learn and co-operate and to the fact that the company’s
actions are readily identified as appropriate, given the ethical norms that
implicitly regulate human behavior in this type of situations. Nevertheless,
no overt assessment of BP or its members can be identified, thus (4) can
be said to invoke rather than inscribe evaluation. The distinction between
inscribed and invoked evaluation is particularly relevant for the analysis of
trust-repair discourse, as implicitness might, in a communicative context
characterized by skepticism and distrust, be actively exploited by the TB as
a persuasive strategy.
The other category of resources that are directly relevant to the emphasize-
the-positive strategy is a↵ect. A↵ect refers to the linguistic expression of
emotions. Similarly to evaluation, it can be either positive or negative and
can be realized through an open-ended range of language resources, includ-
ing adjectives (e.g. happy, anxious), verbs (e.g. want, fear), nouns (e.g.
anger, love) and adverbs (e.g. reluctantly, surprisingly). A↵ect can refer
to both the emotions expressed by the speaker – authorial a↵ect – as well
as to the linguistic expressions that describe emotions felt by third parties
– non-authorial a↵ect (Martin and White, 2005). In discourse, a↵ect plays
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a central role in establishing empathy and communicating proximity with
the interlocutor. In this sense, it is an important resource for realizing the
emphasize-the-positive strategy, as in (5).
(5) The explosion and fire on the Deepwater Horizon rig shocked
everyone within BP, and we feel great sadness that 11 people died.
The use of negatively loaded emotion words in this passage serves to show
that the company shares the su↵ering that the victims of the spill experi-
enced. By demonstrating the company’s sensitivity, understanding and care
for those a↵ected by the accident, this passage can be seen to communicate
benevolence. This analysis is represented in Fig. 7. Similarly to example (3)
above, this example counts as an instance of emphasize-the-positive strategy
rather than of neutralize-the-negative strategy because no dialogic engage-
ment with other viewpoints or discourses is overtly signaled. The CEO’s
statement is formulated as a simple declarative sentence.
!Discourse-as-text !
negative affect 
 
Communicative action !
emphasize the positive 
(empathy) 
Sought effect 
 
benevolence 
Figure 7: A schematic representation of example 5
4 Analysis
The model outlined above was applied to the analysis of BP’s 2010 CEO
letter. The letter was included in BP’s 2010 annual report8 and was signed
by the newly appointed CEO Robert Dudley, an American and former chief
of BP’s Gulf Coast Restoration Organization.
The main goal of the analysis is to demonstrate the descriptive and ex-
planatory potential of the model through a systematic examination of the
text. In addition, it aims to provide an in-depth account of the discur-
sive strategies adopted by BP’s CEO to repair trust in the company after
the spill. The letter, which is 2,177 words long, has been analyzed in full.
However, due to space constraints, only a limited number of representative
examples is discussed in detail in sections 4.3 to 4.5. The complete analysis
can be found in the Appendix. Section 4.2 provides a concise overview of
the results. The next section briefly describes the genre of CEO letters.
4.1 CEO letters
CEO letters are a common feature of the annual report, a document pro-
duced by public companies and made available online. The report provides
information about the companies’ financial position and performance. CEO
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letters are generally laid out as signed, personal letters, and are included at
the beginning of the report. They are voluntary and unaudited documents in
which the CEO summarizes and evaluates the company’s performance dur-
ing the preceding year and outlines its strategy for the future. Whereas the
annual report fulfills both an informative and promotional function, CEO
letters are essentially promotional in nature; they are written to persuade
shareholders of the validity of their investments in the company and to pro-
mote a positive corporate image (Breeze, 2013; Hyland, 1998). Given that
CEO letters are the most widely read section of the annual report, they
play an important role in shaping the readers’ impressions of a company’s
performance, strategy and conduct (Hyland, 1998: 224).
CEO letters are rarely the product of one single person but the result of
a collaborative process that may involve, in addition to the CEO, the chief
financial o cer and the chief legal o cer (Thomas, 1997). However, it is
ultimately the CEO who assumes responsibility for the letter and the person
who the readers will likely hold accountable for its content. CEO letters
primarily address a company’s shareholders and investors but, given their
easy accessibility, the potential readership of these documents is broader and
includes the news media, government agencies, employees and members of
society at large (Breeze, 2013: 84).
4.2 Overview of results
Table 1 synthesizes and summarizes the findings of the complete analysis
of BP’s CEO letter reporting the main discursive moves made by the CEO
to repair trust in BP after the spill. The moves are organized according to
their strategic functions, i.e. emphasize the positive versus neutralize the
negative, and their communicative goals, i.e. repairing ability, integrity or
benevolence. The subsequent sections discuss some of the discourse moves
included in table 1 in more detail.
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Emphasize the positive (EP) Neutralize the negative (NN)
Ability BP activated an extraordinary oil spill response
BP has a sound underlying performance and solid foundation
2011 will be a year of consolidation for BP Consolidation in 2011 is expected
Integrity BP committed to an immediate and detailed internal inves-
tigation
Yet, prior to the spill BP had put safety at the center of
everything
BP is striving to learn from the accident The spill was unthinkable (but it happened)
BP aims to become an industry leader in risk management No single factor caused the accident
BPs priorities remained clear despite the criticisms
Hazards cannot be completely eliminated
BP will not engage in opencast mining
BP does understand that business-as-usual is not an option
In spite of what happened, deep-water drilling is necessary
Benevolence BPs employees and American retirees worked hard to solve
the crisis
BP knows nothing can restore the loss of the victims of the
accident
BP is shocked, saddened and deeply sorry for the accident
The CEO is personally attached to the Gulf of Mexico
The decision to suspend dividends to shareholders was very
di cult
Table 1: Overview of results
4.3 Repairing ability
As noted earlier, BP’s handling of the spill was a major source of controversy.
The company’s repeated failed attempts to stop the leak contributed to
create the impression that the company did not have a clear strategy or the
necessary technical means to cope with the spill. In his letter, the CEO
does not mention nor does he try to justify BP’s failures. Instead, strong
emphasis is placed on the company’s e↵orts to remediate the e↵ects of the
spill.
(6) On 22 April 2010 the Deepwater Horizon sank, and a major oil spill
response was activated. At its peak this involved the mobilization of
some 48,000 people, the deployment of around 2,500 miles of boom
and the coordination of more than 6,500 vessels. Field operations
brought together experts from key agencies, organizations and BP.
Thousands of our people flew in from around the world and stayed
and worked for weeks and months. Nearly 500 retirees from BP
America called up to say they wanted to help. This was an
extraordinary response.
The actions undertaken by the company in the aftermath of the accident are
positively evaluated in terms of scope (a major oil spill response) and quality
(an extraordinary response). These evaluative expressions provide the inter-
pretive frame for the ‘hard facts’ included in the paragraph. Through the
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interplay between evaluative language and factual information, the superla-
tiveness (Bednarek and Caple, 2012) of the response is brought to the fore.
The ‘staggering’ figures reported boost the rhetorical force and credibility
of the CEO’s account and foreground BP’s organizational skills and know-
how. The credibility and appropriateness of BP’s actions are reinforced by
referring to the presence of experts from key agencies, organizations and the
company itself. Prominence is given to the commitment and determination
of its employees, who stayed and worked in the areas hit by the disaster
for weeks and months, and to the generosity and altruism of its American
retirees, who participated in the spill e↵orts because they wanted to. If we
apply the model to (6), we observe that the CEO deploys the emphasize-
the-positive (EP) strategy to show that the company acted in a competent
manner after the spill. He does not try to explicitly and directly counteract
the discourses that challenged the company’s ability, but instead chooses to
o↵er an alternative version of the spill response ‘story’ in which the com-
pany is depicted as well organized and maximally committed to solve the
crisis. As shown above, at the discourse-as-text level, this strategy is realized
through a combination of positive inscribed and invoked evaluation.
A similar strategy is used to reassure BP’s shareholders about the com-
pany’s ability to overcome the crisis. The CEO devotes the second half of the
letter to detailing the new strategy that the management has put in place
to “realize greater value” for investors. The credibility of the new strategy
is discursively constructed through the use of positive evaluative wordings
(EP strategy). BP is said to have gained access to “a wide range of new
upstream resource opportunities”. In January 2011, the company signed the
“first major equity-linked partnership between a national and international
oil company” with the Russian oil giant Rosneft and, in February 2011,
the company announced “a second historic agreement”. The company is
represented as dynamic and forward-thinking. According to the CEO, BP
is taking “an even more active approach to buying, developing and selling
upstream assets” and is “moving swiftly to address its weaknesses and build
on its strengths”. To reinforce this positive message and promote confidence
in BP’s future, the CEO concludes this part of the letter with an optimistic
statement.
(7) As to the immediate future, I expect 2011 to be a year of
consolidation for BP, as we focus on completing our previously
announced divestment programme, meeting our commitments in the
US and bringing renewed rigour to the way we manage risk.
Example (7) shows again the EP strategy in action. Notably, however, the
CEO’s optimistic forecast is introduced by expect, which, by framing the
proposition that ‘2011 will be a year of consolidation for BP’ as grounded in
the CEO’s subjective assessment, performs a dialogically expanding function
(see section 3). In this sense, this verb can be seen to convey a prudent
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stance of detached objectivity, which reinforces the credibility of the CEO’s
claim, while at the same time lowering the interpersonal cost of potential
misjudgments (‘anticipatory’ NN strategy).
4.4 Repairing integrity
The main challenges to BP’s integrity that the CEO addresses in his letter
relate to: a) the company’s alleged disregard for safety before the accident;
b) its priorities in the aftermath of the spill; c) the company’s measures
to prevent similar events from recurring. The CEO confronts the first of
these challenges by stressing that, contrary to what the disaster seems to
suggest (discourse marker yet - NN strategy), before the spill “the company
had put safe and reliable operations at the centre of everything”. Further,
to counter the negative ‘negligence’ discourse, the accident is represented
as unpredictable (example (2)), a view that is claimed to be shared by the
entire industry. This ‘endorsement’ has a dialogic contracting e↵ect and
serves, on the one hand, to grant credibility to a potentially controversial
claim (NN strategy: neutralize skepticism) and, on the other, to bu↵er its
interpersonal consequences by partially shifting responsibility for it to other
players in the context of the spill. Finally, the causes of the accident are
described as complex and as involving multiple factors and agents.
(8) Our investigation report was published on 8 September 2010, and
found that no single factor caused the accident. The report stated
that decisions made by multiple companies and work teams
contributed to the accident, and these arose from a complex and
interlinked series of mechanical, human judgement, engineering
design, operational implementation and team interface failures.
In (8), the CEO adopts a NN strategy through denial (marked negation
no) and the evidential marker found, which construes the results of the
company’s internal report as credible, scientifically established ‘facts’. Both
these linguistic devices function as contractive dialogic operators in this
context, acting to ‘fend o↵’ the idea that BP is the sole company to blame.
To respond to the second concern mentioned above, the CEO strongly
emphasizes that, even during the toughest days of the crisis, BP’s actions
were driven by unequivocal priorities.
(9) We also found ourselves in the midst of intense political and media
scrutiny. We received incredible support and faced tremendous
criticism, but our priorities remained clear – provide support to the
families and friends of those 11 men who died, stop the leak, attack
the spill, protect the shore, support all the people and places a↵ected.
(9) shows an example of NN strategy instantiated by the adversative marker
but which, like other counter formulations is “dialogistic in the same way
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as denials in that [it] invoke[s] a contrary position which is then said not
to hold” (Martin and White, 2005: 120). The “tremendous criticisms” that
were leveled at the company after the spill are set in contrast to the propo-
sition that “BP’s priorities remained clear”. The voices questioning BP’s
priorities are thus confronted with a ‘positive’ claim and, at the same time,
by representing criticisms as equally legitimate to the “incredible support”
that the company also received.
One of the most important yet complex goals that the CEO had to ac-
complish to repair stakeholders’ trust was that of convincing them that the
company will operate safely in the future. Trust is, in fact, future-oriented
(Linell and Keselman, 2011: 156), i.e. one’s decision to trust another person
is crucially related to their expectations about the trustee’s future behav-
ior (see also Gambetta, 1988; Hardin, 2002; Mo¨llering, 2006). The CEO
concludes the letter by explicitly addressing stakeholders’ concerns in this
respect.
(10) I have heard people ask “Does BP ‘get it’?” Residents of the Gulf,
our employees and investors, governments, industry partners and
people around the world all want to know whether we understand
that a return to business-as-usual is not an option. We may not have
communicated it enough at times, but yes, we get it.
In (10), the CEO engages in an imagined dialogue with stakeholders and
directly responds to their preoccupation with the legacy of the spill and BP’s
future conduct. He sets out a very articulated NN strategy that is realized
through a rhetorical question, two negation markers and the adversative
conjunction but.9 Through the interplay of these dialogically contractive
resources, the CEO aims to neutralize the negative discourse according to
which the company does not fully realize the implications of the spill and
the need for change that it prompted. By engaging with and ‘fending o↵’
these adverse viewpoints, he ultimately aims to reassure stakeholders that
BP ‘has learned its lesson’ from the spill and repair the company’s integrity.
4.5 Repairing benevolence
BP’s benevolence towards the victims of the spill and, more generally, to-
wards Americans came under intense scrutiny after the spill. One element
of the CEO’s strategy to repair this aspect of BP’s trustworthiness consists
in showing that the company shared people’s concern about the detrimental
e↵ects of the spill and desire to bring the situation back to normal. This
can be seen in (6), where the CEO emphasizes the scope and urgency of the
company’s spill response e↵orts, and in (9), where he attempts to ‘set the
record straight’ about BP’s priorities. Demonstrating alignment of intents,
however, could be insu cient to be perceived as benevolent, as truly con-
cerned about the trustor’s own interests and welfare. The former CEO’s ‘I
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want my life back’ incident clearly shows this. What was missing in that
infelicitous attempt to apologize for the disaster was an acknowledgment
of the victims’ perspective and an attempt to establish empathy with them.
The CEO seeks to re-build this type of alignment in his letter. The very first
paragraph is entirely devoted to showing that the disaster and the deaths
it caused have deeply a↵ected all members of BP, and that the company
recognizes and cares for the su↵ering of the victims and their families.
(11) The tragic events of 2010 will forever be written in the memory of
this company and the people who work here. The explosion and fire
on the Deepwater Horizon rig shocked everyone within BP, and we
feel great sadness that 11 people died. We are deeply sorry for the
grief felt by their families and friends. We know nothing can restore
the loss of those men.
Empathy is communicated in (11) through the repeated use of negative af-
fect terms – tragic, shocked, great sadness, deeply sorry, grief. These choices
serve to foreground the company’s emotions towards the accident and to
show that BP shares the su↵ering of the families and friends of the victims.
These aspects of the CEO’s discourse can be interpreted as constituting
an EP strategy. By exposing the company’s own vulnerability and demon-
strating empathy for the victims of the spill, the CEO seeks to establish
a common ground of shared feelings with them that can contribute to the
promotion of an image of the company as truly caring and benevolent. Ex-
ample (11) includes an instance of NN strategy as well, which is realized
through the dialogic contractive markers know and nothing. Through the
use of these devices, the CEO engages with and seeks to neutralize the –
actual or potential – adverse discourse according to which BP does not fully
realize the gravity of the accident and its impact on the victims’ lives.
As noted earlier, one of the main sources of distrust in BP’s benevolence
resided in the perceived distance and conflict between the company and
the American public that BP’s PR failures had contributed to create. To
counter these negative impressions, the CEO puts to the fore his American
identity and strives to show that he personally cares for the areas and people
hit by the spill.
(12) And it all started in a part of the world that’s very close to my heart.
I grew up in Mississippi, and spent summers with my family
swimming and fishing in the Gulf. I know those beaches and waters
well. When I heard about the accident I could immediately picture
how it might a↵ect the people who live and work along that coast.
Example (12) can be interpreted as an instance of EP strategy, whereby
the CEO’s sense of belonging and emotional attachment (as in very close to
my heart) to the areas a↵ected by the spill are foregrounded, promoting a
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positive perception of his – and by extension, the company’s – benevolence
towards the inhabitants of the Gulf and, in general, towards Americans.
By stressing his American roots and portraying himself as a member of the
community (he could immediately picture the impact the spill would have
on the local people’s lives), the CEO also seeks to establish his credibility
as a trustworthy interlocutor, a task that his predecessor failed at.
So far the discussion has focused on the CEO’s attempt to display benev-
olence towards the victims of the spill and, more broadly, towards the Amer-
ican public. Crucially, however, the letter is primarily addressed to BP’s
shareholders, whose interests were also severely impacted by the disaster.
Shareholders’ concerns are addressed by stressing the company’s ability, as
discussed in section 4.3. The CEO, however, seeks to show benevolence to
them as well. This can be observed at two points in the text. The first
of these is the salutation. The CEO addresses his readers as equals using
the formula Dear fellow shareholders10, evoking in this way a discourse of
solidarity and companionship (Breeze, 2012: 11). The second is when he
comments on the board of directors’ decision to suspend dividend payments
for several months after the spill.
(13) As part of our response, we took the decision to cancel further
dividends in 2010. While we know that many shareholders rely on
their regular payments, we also had to protect the company and
secure its long-term future. The board of BP took this decision with
a heavy heart, but I believe it was the right thing to do in truly
exceptional circumstances.
A↵ect (as in with a heavy heart) is used here to underscore BP’s care about
shareholders’ interests. The fact that suspending dividends was a di cult
and emotional decision proves that the board of directors is truly concerned
about the investors’ financial security (EP strategy). In fact, that decision
was made in consideration of a shared goal, that of securing the company’s
long-term future. Given the exceptional circumstances in which BP found
itself, the board’s decision was the best possible, not to deceive, but to fulfill
shareholders’ interests.
5 Discussion
Table 1 shows that the CEO adopts a combination of the EP and NN strate-
gies for all the three facets of trustworthiness. Interestingly, however, con-
siderable di↵erences can be observed in the use of these strategies across
the facets. While attempts to repair trust in BP’s ability and benevolence
are mainly pursued through the EP strategy, the opposite pattern emerges
for integrity. The CEO’s discursive e↵orts to repair the company’s integrity
are, in fact, almost entirely based on the NN strategy. Di↵erent hypothe-
ses could be proposed to explain this finding. First, while the accident,
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as discussed above, impacted all three aspects of BP’s trustworthiness, the
company’s integrity problem was arguably more complex and far-reaching in
its implications, and it also had a legal dimension. The actual and potential
sources of distrust in BP’s integrity were multifarious as both the company’s
conduct before and after the spill fell under intense public scrutiny and the
accident had generated concern about its future actions. Tackling these mul-
tiple sources of distrust may thus have constituted a communicative priority
over emphasizing the company’s positive ethical qualities. Second, it might
be questioned whether a more pronounced reliance on the EP strategy to
repair BP’s integrity would have been a viable option at all. Indeed, pre-
cisely in view of the numerous challenges to this aspect of the company’s
trustworthiness, being overly positive about its integrity may have provoked
the opposite e↵ect of attracting suspicion and generating even more distrust.
These considerations raise the question as to why the NN strategy is not
as widely employed for repairing the other facets of BP’s trustworthiness.
As far as ability is concerned, one possible explanation for this might reside
in the fact that neutralizing the negative discourses would have required
focusing on the technical details of the spill control operations, the discus-
sion of which would probably have been unsuitable in this context. Another
possible explanation is that, given the obvious nature of BP’s technical di -
culties in controlling the spill, any attempt to confront the negative inability
discourses would not have been perceived as particularly credible. As Linell
and Markova´ (2013: 220) point out, “to speak means to take risks by ex-
posing one’s own discourse to doubt”. Sound evidence or arguments are
needed to support the credibility of one’s claim or any attempt to success-
fully counter alternative or adverse viewpoints, particularly in a situation
where the trustworthiness of the speaker has been damaged. In the face of
considerable evidence for BP’s ill-preparedness to an event of the magnitude
of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, any attempt to neutralize the negative
would have been arduous, if not impossible. Not surprisingly, the CEO
avoids mentioning the well-relief operations altogether and shifts the focus
of attention to the spill response, which he describes and positively evalu-
ates providing detailed information in support of his claims (example in (6)).
As far as benevolence is concerned, the CEO’s preference for the EP strat-
egy might be explained on similar grounds, namely that the interpersonal
costs and risks involved in directly confronting the adverse discourses would
have been too high to make this a viable strategy. Given the widespread
sentiments of anger and frustration that the disaster had created, o↵ering
positive evidence instead of trying to counter commonly-held negative views
may have represented a comparatively safer option.
So far we have concentrated on the discursive strategies that the CEO
deploys at di↵erent points in his letter to target di↵erent potential challenges
to BP’s trustworthiness. If we focus on how these strategies are expressed
and, in particular, on the use of dialogic engagement resources, we can ob-
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serve an interesting pattern. Most of the markers of engagement used in the
letter are dialogically contracting. In other words, most of these markers can
be seen to serve the purpose of disallowing potential disagreeing opinions
and protecting BP and the CEO’s statements from criticism. Particularly
striking in this sense is the frequent use of denial, which is a maximally
contracting dialogic operator, e.g. in (8) and (10). The frequent use of di-
alogically contracting markers can be seen to configure what we may call a
defensive stance. Having been subject to intense public and media scrutiny
and having received strong criticism from di↵erent quarters, the CEO needed
to protect the company’s image from further damage. Yet, such a defen-
sive stance appears to be in contrast with the strong emphasis on learning,
transparency and humility that emerges in other parts of the letter, e.g. (4).
We suggest that this apparent contradiction is the result of the CEO’s need
to cater for and respond to multiple competing requirements stemming from
di↵erent audiences, an aspect to which we now turn.
The analysis presented above has been carried out under the assumption
that, despite explicitly addressing BP’s shareholders, the CEO’s message was
intended for a broader audience. The findings of the analysis support this
assumption as they show that the CEO responds to a variety of concerns
in his letter, some of which go beyond the specific prerogatives of the com-
pany’s owners. But, how can these two perspectives be reconciled? Clark’s
(1992) concept of audience design o↵ers a viable solution to this apparent
incongruity. Audience design refers to the process, inherent in every lan-
guage act, whereby speakers identify di↵erent hearers, assign roles to them,
and design their utterances in accordance with their assumptions about the
di↵erent hearers’ knowledge, beliefs and suppositions (Clark, 1992: 217).
Put di↵erently, audience design is the process by which speakers display a
sensitivity and orientation towards the di↵erent audiences they envisage for
their message. According to Clark (1992: 217), there are three main types of
hearer roles: participants, addressees, and overhearers. Participants are the
hearers who the speaker intends to take part in the communicative exchange
(Clark, 1992: 218). Among the participant, addressees are those who are
vocatively designated as the recipients of the message (Clark, 1992: 218).
In other words, they are the hearers that the speaker addresses directly and
explicitly. Finally, overhearers are the hearers who are not thought of as
participating in the exchange by the speaker but that happen to eavesdrop
(Clark, 1992: 218).
Following Clark’s classification, we propose that the shareholders are the
addressees of the CEO’s letter. As seen above, they are the primary target
audience of CEO letters and they are explicitly addressed at the beginning of
the text. The victims of the spill, the American public opinion and the gov-
ernment are the participants. They are not conceived of as mere overhearers
of the CEO’s message, but they are implicitly addressed as active partakers
in the communicative exchange initiated by the letter. Based on the results
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of the analysis, we suggest that much of the CEO’s message is designed with
the participants in mind, rather than the addressees. As Clark (1992: 214)
notes, “[o]n many occasions, government o cials, television newsmen, and
others are ostensibly addressing certain hearers, but their primary aim is
to inform the on-looking public of what they are saying to these hearers”.
It is precisely this complex dialogic arrangement that can be seen to con-
stitute the source of the contradictions discussed above. Thus, protecting
the company’s image from further damage and showing that the situation is
under control was necessary for the sake of the shareholders. Concurrently,
the CEO also needed to show transparency, openness and understanding to
respond to the legitimate demands arising from other stakeholders and the
public opinion. The result is a skillful exercise in diplomacy, whereby the
CEO projects a positive, trustworthy corporate image to the stakeholders,
at the same time as he conveys firmness to investors.
6 Concluding remarks
This article has introduced a novel conceptual framework for the analysis
of trust-repair discourse that connects the construct of interpersonal trust
(Mayer et al., 1995) with a linguistic analysis at the level of discourse-as-
text (Fairclough, 1992). The application of the framework has been demon-
strated through a systematic analysis of BP’s CEO letter published after
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill of 2010. The model predicts that, when
trust has been damaged, the trust-breaker – in this case BP – adopts one or
a combination of two alternative discursive strategies. The TB can either
dialogically seek to neutralize the discourses that create distrust or, alterna-
tively or in combination, emphasize the positive aspects of his actions and
his persona. These strategies are manifested in text by the use of dialogic en-
gagement and evaluative/a↵ective language respectively. Drawing on Mayer
et al. (1995), the communicative goal of these strategies is that of improving
the trustor’s assessment of the TB’s ability, integrity and benevolence and
repair trust.
This study emphasizes the central role played by discourse as a vehicle for
negotiating and repairing trust. It contributes to the existing literature on
the topic of trust in discourse and communication by shedding some light on
the discursive and pragmatic dynamics of trust and by providing a coherent
and comprehensive conceptual framework for the analysis of trust-repair
discourse. From the point of view of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill case,
this article o↵ers some insights into how BP discursively responded to the
accident and attempted to renegotiate trust after the spill, thus contributing
to the growing body of literature focusing on this implication-rich case study.
Clearly, more research is needed to test the wider applicability of the
model proposed here and to develop it further. Future work could focus on
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expanding the model, by investigating the trust-building potential of linguis-
tic features and discursive strategies that have not been accounted for here.
For example, in the text analyzed above we could identify several instances
of personalization strategies (Van Leeuwen, 1996), whereby the identity of
specific individuals or groups is foregrounded. This can be observed in ex-
ample 6, where the CEO refers to the company’s employees as our people
and mentions the retirees from BP America, in 11, where he recounts the
sorrow felt by everyone within BP, or in 12, where the CEO’s own identity
and personal history are put to the fore. These choices seem to underpin an
EP strategy aimed at humanizing an otherwise faceless corporation. This, in
turn, may contribute to the improvement of the company’s perceived benev-
olence, on the grounds that ‘actual people’ can understand other people’s
needs and feelings better than an impersonal organization. Future research
could also compare similar cases of trust-repair discourse to add empirical
robustness to the model. Considering similar instances of trust-repair dis-
course might also contribute to explaining when and how EP strategies are
preferred or, indeed, preferable to NN strategies. In sum, much remains to
be explored to better understand the dynamics of trust in discourse. We
hope this article will stimulate more research in this area.
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Notes
1It is important to note that lack of distrust does not entail high trust (e.g. Lewicki
et al., 1998; Schul et al., 2008; Swift, 2001).
2It is noteworthy to mention that the final report of the National Commission on the
BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and O↵shore Drilling, which was established by U.S.
President Barack Obama in the aftermath of the spill to investigate its causes, highlights
that one of the main factors that contributed to create the conditions for the disaster
was the U.S. government o cials’ excess of trust in BP and the other oil companies
engaged in deepwater oil drilling in the Gulf. The report states that: “The accident of
April 20 was avoidable. It resulted from clear mistakes made in the first instance by
BP, Halliburton, and Transocean, and by government o cials who, relying too much on
industry’s assertions of the safety of their operations, failed to create and apply a program
of regulatory oversight that would have properly minimized the risks of deepwater drilling”
(National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and O↵shore Drilling, 2011:
127, emphasis mine).
3This phrase, a mistranslation of the Swedish idiom ‘den lilla ma¨nniskan’, which corre-
sponds to ‘common people’ in English, fueled public indignation, despite the Chairman’s
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subsequent apologies and explanations.
4Although the discussion of the model and the analysis included in section 4 will
proceed, for ease of illustration, from the sought e↵ect level to the discourse-as-text level,
the latter is shown on the left-hand side of Fig. 3, in order to mark it as the most basic
level of analysis within our framework.
5For the sake of clarity, the discussion of each example focuses on one relevant linguistic
phenomenon only. However, it is important to note that some of the examples do, in fact,
contain more relevant linguistic features. A full account of these extracts is included in
the Appendix.
6The dialogic expanding e↵ect of the use of the epistemic see can be perceived by
comparing example (2) with its artificially constructed monoglossic version: A subsea
blowout in deep water is as a very, very low-probability event.
7While the CEO’s statement in (2) might be positively interpreted as implying that,
given that the accident was unconceivable the company acted ‘in good faith’, it does
not include any clearly identifiable positive assessment of the company or its member.
Therefore, example (2) cannot be classified as an instance of the emphasize-the-positive
strategy.
8Freely available through the company’s online archive at: http://www.bp.com/en/
global/corporate/investors/annual-reporting/archive.html
9The last sentence includes an example of a recurring arrangement of a
conceding/concurring proposition (We may not have communicated it enough at times)
followed by a countering proposition (but yes, we get it). Martin and White (2005: 124)
label this type of discursive patterns ‘concede + counter’ pairings, whereby the speaker
first presents him/herself as agreeing with the putative reader and subsequently rejects
the inferences that naturally derive from the first utterance to promote their own view-
point on the matter at hand. From a rhetorical perspective, the first utterance serves
to acknowledge and legitimize the putative reader’s viewpoint, construing alignment and
solidarity with him or her. This, in turn, can favor the reader’s acceptance of the speaker’s
opinion. Therefore, the use of a ‘concede + counter’ pairing in this context can be seen
to boost the persuasive force of the CEO’s discursive strategy by favoring and inviting
consensus.
10It is noteworthy that this type of salutation was never used in previous years’ letters
to shareholders, nor is it used by the company’s main competitors in their letters to
shareholders published the same year (Breeze, 2012).
References
Austin, Langshaw J., 1962. How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: Claren-
don Press.
Bakhtin, Mikhail M., 1981. The Dialogical Imagination. Austin: University
of Texas Press.
Barney, Jay B. and Hansen, Mark H., 1994. Trustworthiness as a source of
competitive advantage. Strategic Management Journal, 15 (S1), 175–190.
Bednarek, Monika, 2006. Evaluation in Media Discourse: Analysis of a
Newspaper Corpus. London & New York: Continuum International Pub-
lishing Group Ltd.
28
MA
NU
SC
RI
PT
Bednarek, Monika, 2008. Emotion Talk across Corpora. Houndmills, Bas-
ingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Bednarek, Monika and Caple, Helen, 2012. News Discourse. London & New
York: Continuum International Publishing Group Ltd.
Besnier, Niko, 1990. Language and a↵ect. Annual Review of Anthropology,
19, 419–451.
Breeze, Ruth, 2012. Legitimation in corporate discourse: Oil corporations
after Deepwater Horizon. Discourse & Society, 23 (1), 3–18.
Breeze, Ruth, 2013. Corporate Discourse. London and New York: Blooms-
bury Academic.
Caldwell, Cam and Clapham, Stephen E., 2003. Organizational trustwor-
thiness: An international perspective. Journal of Business Ethics, 47 (4),
349–364.
Choi, Jinbong, 2012. A content analysis of BP’s press releases dealing with
crisis. Public Relations Review, 38 (3), 422–429.
Clark, Herbert H., 1992. Arenas of Language Use. Chicago & London:
University of Chicago Press.
Cook, Karen S., 2001. Trust in Society. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Diers, Audra R and Donohue, Jennie, 2013. Synchronizing crisis responses
after a transgression: An analysis of BP’s enacted crisis response to the
Deepwater Horizon crisis in 2010. Journal of Communication Manage-
ment, 17 (3), 252–269.
Fairclough, Norman, 1992. Discourse and Social Change. Cambridge: Polity
Press.
Fairclough, Norman, 2003. Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social
Research. London: Routledge.
Fairclough, Norman and Wodak, Ruth, 1997. Critical Discourse Analysis.
In: Van Dijk, Teun A., (Ed.), Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary
Introduction, pp. 258–284. London: Sage Publications Limited.
Frooman, Je↵, 1999. Stakeholder influence strategies. Academy of Manage-
ment Review, 24 (2), 191–205.
Fuoli, Matteo, 2012. Assessing social responsibility: A quantitative analysis
of Appraisal in BPs and IKEAs social reports. Discourse & Communica-
tion, 6 (1), 55–81.
29
MA
NU
SC
RI
PT
Gambetta, Diego, 1988. Can we trust trust? In: Gambetta, Diego, (Ed.),
Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, pp. 213–237. Oxford
& New York: Basil Blackwell.
Ga¨rdenfors, Peter, 2014. The Geometry of Meaning: Semantics Based on
Conceptual Spaces. Cambridge MA and London: MIT Press.
Gill, Duane A., Picou, J. Steven, and Ritchie, Liesel A., 2012. The Exxon
Valdez and BP Oil Spills A Comparison of Initial Social and Psychological
Impacts. American Behavioral Scientist, 56 (1), 3–23.
Gillespie, Alex, 2011. Dialogical dynamics of trust and distrust in the Cuban
Missile Crisis. In: Markova´, Ivana and Gillespie, Alex, (Eds.), Trust and
Conflict: Representation, Culture and Dialogue, pp. 139–156. New York:
Routledge.
Gillespie, Alex and Cornish, Flora, 2013. The Northern Rock bank run: An
analysis of communication within a distrust sequence. In: Markova´, Ivana
and Linell, Per, (Eds.), Dialogical Approaches to Trust in Communication,
pp. 79–101. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing.
Gillespie, Nicole and Dietz, Graham, 2009. Trust repair after an
organization-level failure. Academy of Management Review, 34 (1), 127–
145.
Greenwood, Michelle and Van Buren III, Harry J., 2010. Trust and stake-
holder theory: Trustworthiness in the organisation–stakeholder relation-
ship. Journal of Business Ethics, 95 (3), 425–438.
Hardin, Russell, 2002. Trust and Trustworthiness. New York: Russell Sage
Foundation.
Harlow, William F., Brantley, Brian C., and Harlow, Rachel Martin, 2011.
BP initial image repair strategies after the Deepwater Horizon spill. Public
Relations Review, 37 (1), 80–83.
Harlow, William Forrest and Harlow, Rachel Martin, 2013. Compensation
and corrective action as the BP response to the Deepwater Horizon inci-
dent. Communication Research Reports, 30 (3), 193–200.
Hart, Christopher, 2011. Critical Discourse Studies in Context and Cogni-
tion. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing.
Hendry, Jamie R, 2005. Stakeholder influence strategies: An empirical ex-
ploration. Journal of Business Ethics, 61 (1), 79–99.
Howell, Gwyneth VJ., Miller, Rohan, and Rushbrook-House, Georgina,
2014. # A little bird told me: Birdcaging the message during the BP
30
MA
NU
SC
RI
PT
disaster. Journal of Global Scholars of Marketing Science, 24 (2), 113–
128.
Hunston, Susan, 2011. Corpus Approaches to Evaluation: Phraseology and
Evaluative Language. New York and London: Routledge.
Hunston, Susan and Thompson, Geo↵rey, 2000. Evaluation in Text: Autho-
rial Stance and the Construction of Discourse. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Hyland, Ken, 1998. Exploring corporate rhetoric: Metadiscourse in the
CEO’s letter. Journal of Business Communication, 35 (2), 224–244.
Ingenho↵, Diana and Sommer, Katharina, 2010. Trust in companies and in
CEOs: A comparative study of the main influences. Journal of Business
Ethics, 95 (3), 339–355.
Kim, Peter H., Ferrin, Donald L., Cooper, Cecily D., and Dirks, Kurt T.,
2004. Removing the shadow of suspicion: The e↵ects of apology versus
denial for repairing competence-versus integrity-based trust violations.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 89 (1), 104–118.
Kramer, Roderick M., 1999. Trust and distrust in organizations: Emerging
perspectives, enduring questions. Annual review of psychology, 50 (1),
569–598.
Levinson, Stephen C., 1983. Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Lewicki, Roy, 2006. Trust, trust development, and trust repair. In: Deutsch,
Morton and Coleman, Peter T., (Eds.), The Handbook of Conflict Reso-
lution: Theory and Practice (Second Edition), pp. 92–119. San Francisco:
Jossey-Bas Publishers.
Lewicki, Roy J., McAllister, Daniel J., and Bies, Robert J., 1998. Trust
and distrust: New relationships and realities. Academy of Management
Review, 23 (3), 438–458.
Linell, Per and Keselman, Olga, 2011. Trustworthiness at stake: Trust
and distrust in investigative interviews with Russian adolescent asylum-
seekers in Sweden. In: Markova´, Ivana and Gillespie, Alex, (Eds.), Trust
and Conflict: Representation, Culture and Dialogue, pp. 156–181. New
York: Routledge.
Linell, Per and Markova´, Ivana, 2013. Dialogical Approaches to Trust in
Communication. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing.
Luhmann, Niklas, 1979. Trust and Power: Two Works by Niklas Luhmann.
Chichester: Wiley.
31
MA
NU
SC
RI
PT
Markova´, Ivana and Gillespie, Alex, 2008. Trust and Distrust: Sociocultural
Perspectives. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing.
Martin, James R. and White, Peter R. R., 2005. The Language of Evalua-
tion: Appraisal in English. London & New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Mayer, Roger C., Davis, James H., and Schoorman, David F., 1995. An in-
tegrative model of organizational trust. Academy of Management Review,
20 (3), 709–734.
McKnight, Harrison D., Cummings, Larry L., and Chervany, Norman L.,
1998. Initial trust formation in new organizational relationships. Academy
of Management Review, 23 (3), 473–490.
Misztal, Barbara, 1996. Trust in Modern Societies: The Search for the Bases
of Social Order. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Mo¨llering, Guido, 2006. Trust: Reason, Routine, Reflexivity. Emerald Group
Publishing.
Muralidharan, Sidharth, Dillistone, Kristie, and Shin, Jae-Hwa, 2011. The
gulf coast oil spill: Extending the theory of image restoration discourse to
the realm of social media and beyond petroleum. Public Relations Review,
37 (3), 226–232.
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and O↵shore
Drilling, 2011. ‘Deep water: The gulf oil disaster and the future of o↵shore
drilling. Report to the President’. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-
OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf. Accessed 14-Aug-
2014.
Ochs, Elinor and Schie↵elin, Bambi, 1989. Language has a heart. Text-
Interdisciplinary Journal for the Study of Discourse, 9 (1), 7–26.
O’Connor, O’Hara Erin, 2011. Organizational apologies: BP as a case study.
Vanderbilt Law Review, 64, 1959–1991.
Palmieri, Rudy, 2009. Regaining trust through argumentation in the con-
text of the current financial-economic crisis. Studies in Communication
Sciences, 9 (2), 59–78.
Paradis, Carita, 2005. Ontologies and construals in lexical semantics. Ax-
iomathes, 15 (4), 541–573.
Paradis, Carita, In press. Meanings of words: theory and application. In:
Hass, U. and Storjohann, P., (Eds.), Handbuch Wort und Wortschatz
(Handbcher Sprachwissen-HSW Band 3). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
32
MA
NU
SC
RI
PT
Paradis, Carita and Willners, Caroline, 2011. Antonymy: From convention
to meaning-making. Review of Cognitive Linguistics, 9 (2), 367–391.
Pirson, Michael and Malhotra, Deepak, 2011. Foundations of organizational
trust: What matters to di↵erent stakeholders? Organization Science, 22
(4), 1087–1104.
Poppo, Laura and Schepker, Donald J., 2010. Repairing public trust in
organizations. Corporate Reputation Review, 13 (2), 124–141.
Ritchie, Liesel Ashley, Gill, Duane A, and Picou, J Steven, 2011. The BP
disaster as an Exxon Valdez rerun. Contexts, 10 (3), 30–35.
Schoorman, David F., Mayer, Roger C., and Davis, James H., 2007. An inte-
grative model of organizational trust: Past, present, and future. Academy
of Management Review, 32 (2), 344–354.
Schul, Yaacov, Mayo, Ruth, and Burnstein, Eugene, 2008. The value of
distrust. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44 (5), 1293–1302.
Schultz, Friederike, Kleinnijenhuis, Jan, Oegema, Dirk, Utz, Sonja, and van
Atteveldt, Wouter, 2012. Strategic framing in the BP crisis: A semantic
network analysis of associative frames. Public Relations Review, 38 (1),
97–107.
Shogren, Elizabeth, 2011. BP: A Textbook Example Of How Not To Handle
PR. Retrieved from http://www.npr.org.
Smithson, Joy and Venette, Steven, 2013. Stonewalling as an image-defense
strategy: A critical examination of BP’s response to the Deepwater Hori-
zon explosion. Communication Studies, 64 (4), 395–410.
Swift, Tracey, 2001. Trust, reputation and corporate accountability to stake-
holders. Business Ethics: A European Review, 10 (1), 16–26.
Sylves, Richard T. and Comfort, Louise K., 2012. The Exxon Valdez and
BP Deepwater Horizon oil spills: Reducing risk in socio-technical systems.
American Behavioral Scientist, 56 (1), 76–103.
Thomas, Jane, 1997. Discourse in the marketplace: The making of meaning
in annual reports. Journal of Business Communication, 34 (1), 47–66.
Tomlinson, Edward C. and Mayer, Roger C., 2009. The role of causal attri-
bution dimensions in trust repair. Academy of Management Review, 34
(1), 85–104.
Van Leeuwen, Theo, 1996. The representation of social actors. In: Caldas-
Coulthard, Carmen Rosa and Coulthard, Malcolm, (Eds.), Texts and
33
MA
NU
SC
RI
PT
Practices: Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis, pp. 32–70. London
and New York: Routledge.
Webb, Tim, 2010. BP boss admits job on the line over
Gulf oil spill. The Guardian online. Retrieved from
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/may/13/bp-boss-admits-
mistakes-gulf-oil-spill. Accessed 2 September 2014.
White, Peter R. R., 2003. Beyond modality and hedging: A dialogic view
of the language of intersubjective stance. Text-Interdisciplinary Journal
for the Study of Discourse, 23 (2), 259–284.
White, Peter R. R., 2012. Exploring the axiological workings of reporter
voice news stories–attribution and attitudinal positioning. Discourse,
Context & Media, 1 (2-3), 57–67.
Wickman, Chad, 2013. Rhetorical framing in corporate press releases: The
case of British Petroleum and the Gulf oil spill. Environmental Commu-
nication, 8 (1), 3–20.
Wodak, Ruth and Meyer, Michael, 2009. Methods for Critical Discourse
Analysis. London: Sage Publications Limited.
Xie, Yi and Peng, Siqing, 2009. How to repair customer trust after negative
publicity: The roles of competence, integrity, benevolence, and forgive-
ness. Psychology & Marketing, 26 (7), 572–589.
34
